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Abstract:  
 
Much comparative research is biased as well as limited by its way of case selection, which 
may well impair the internal and external validity of the results. Furthermore, too often 
comparisons are made without explicitly departing from theory-guided questions in relation to 
the research design developed. Finally, concurrent logics of inquiry due to case selection and 
research design are often insufficiently reflected upon. All this implies that comparative 
political analysis remains shallow in developing new theoretical insights. In this article these 
issues are raised and discussed. By means of three research traditions in comparative politics 
we demonstrate how positive theory development can be achieved by means of applying the 
comparative approach rigorously and consciously. Essential is that theory comes before 
method to advance proper comparative analyses of politics and society. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
In 1921 Lord Bryce published a study of the constitutional design of democracy. His point of 
departure was that ample modern democracies were available to undertake a systematic 
comparative inquiry. The aim of such a study was to “describe the working of actual 
democratic governments […] classifying and comparing the phenomena which the 
examination of these governments reveals.” (Bryce 1921: 9). Most important, in his view was 
that the comparative method could help to avoid biased views by assuming one particular 
country as typical for the direction and working of democracies in general. Hence, taking 
politics as a ‘science’ by applying the comparative approach Bryce sought to make analyses 
by recording the efforts made and results achieved by and within constitutional democracies. 
To this end the method of enquiry ought to be empirical: “It is facts that are needed: Facts, 
Facts, Facts. When facts are supplied, each of us can try to reason from them.” (Bryce 1921: 
13).  
This narrative demonstrates that the comparative approach of politics has a long tradition 
in political science. Of course, the tradition of comparative politics dates back even further 
(think of Aristotle, Herodotus, de Toqueville, et cetera). Yet, what was new to this approach 
was the idea that comparative enquiries should be based on systematically ordered empirical 
evidence. It should not be used as illustrations of isolated situations or singular systems. The 
‘facts’ form the platform for inference as regards to regularities across systems. This 
procedure would induce classifications and typologies, on the one hand, and would lead to 
analytical conclusions with respect to the relationship between the organization of a 
democratic system and its actual performance, on the other hand (see Finer 1999). 
It is interesting to note (in passing) that James Bryce was familiar with the ideas and 
practices of political science in the US and of the emerging approach that is now known as 
‘behavioralism’ (see Macridis 1955; Almond 1968). The behavioral approach emphasized 
strongly a scientific attitude, causal arguments and factual description. However, it was 
mainly directed to the study of American politics and the analysis of democratic politics by 
means of micro-level data (like, for example, survey analysis, cultural features and 
psychological factors; see: Katznelson and Milner 2002: 4-5). 
This ‘school of thought’ has been quite influential. It begot an almost ‘paradigmatic’ 
status in the USA and was a dominant force in the institutionalization and professionalisation 
of political science (APSA). Yet, this development was not as influential in Europe (before 
and after the Second World War; see Almond 1996) and differed from its American 
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counterpart in one important aspect: the institutional analysis of politics always remained a 
crucial feature of the study of politics and of ‘Comparative Politics’ in particular (Daalder 
1993). In particular after the Second World War the comparative analysis of political systems 
became a cornerstone within political science. The study of democratic governance, its 
organization, its working and its performance in reality has always been at the core of this 
sub-discipline. This is, of course, exemplified in widely used connotation of cross-national 
analysis and international comparisons in many introductions to course books on political 
science (see e.g.: Berg-Schlosser and Müller-Rommel 1987; Dogan and Pelassy 1990; Peters 
1998; Hague and Harrop 2004)1. It is only since the late 1980s and during the 1990s that one 
notices the deliberate use of the term comparative politics with regard to political systems and 
related features that are also intra-systematic (e.g. parties and governments per se or directed 
towards elements of political systems). Hence, the so-called ‘national’ (or country-level) bias 
has been dominant for a long time (see: Keman 1993b; Landman 2003). This bias is a logical 
consequence of the fact that most political systems existing during the 19th and 20th century 
were independent sovereign states (more often than not with a constitution and centralized 
state powers). Hence, ‘nation-states’ were considered ideally suited as cases for cross-national 
analysis.  
Finally, the nationalist bias also has been conducive to ‘parochialism’, i.e. focusing 
almost exclusively on the larger and richer democracies, and over-emphasizing constitutional 
features (i.e. the ‘polity’; see for instance: Powell 1982; Macridis and Burg 1991; Almond and 
Verba 1993). All this has led to the idea that comparative research tends to produce one-sided 
knowledge that is difficult to generalize. Thus, the lesson to be learned is that comparative 
political research ought to focus more on the essential components of a given political system, 
which in turn should direct the proper use of the comparative method (see Keman 1993b; 
Peters 1998). In my view this will help to avoid ecological fallacies and biased analyses. Last 
but not least, if and when theory and method are consciously and rigorously drawn together, it 
will advance theory development within political science. Combining plausible propositions 
with relevant evidence will be conducive to “positive” (vis-à-vis normative) theory 
development (see Pennings et al. 2006: 32; Easton 1990). 
In this article the focus will be explicitly on the comparative approach of political 
systems, which are the features that are conceptualized on the macro-scopical level and can be 
methodologically analyzed and observed on the system’s level only (Holt and Turner 1970; 
Mair 1996). This is what I call the ‘systemic’ type of analysis and the features studied are then 
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defined as part of that particular system under review. In the remainder of this paper I shall 
first discuss the pro’s and con’s of the comparative method with respect to the study of 
political systems. The next section focuses on developing an optimal research strategy for 
comparing systemic features. In the penultimate section three different approaches will be 
described to demonstrate the ‘state of art’. Finally, I shall (attempt) to draw some conclusions 
as to the achievements in terms of (positive) theory development, on the one hand, and point 
out some of the remaining pitfalls and caveats with respect to comparing across political 
systems, on the other hand. 
 
2.  Why comparing political systems? 
 
Within the discipline of Political Science the comparison of systems has always been a central 
feature. Not only because the Greeks in ancient times and European scholars already 
compared political systems in the 18th and 19th century, but also because the national state was 
always considered as the (almost) ‘natural’ albeit biased core within the discipline. 
Nevertheless, only in the 20th century when political science developed into an established 
academic discipline by means of professionalisation and institutionalization did the 
comparative approach became an accepted branch (see: Lijphart 1971; Lasswell 1968; 
Daalder 1993; Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997: 3-16). However, at the same time it appeared 
difficult to define comparative politics and delineate it from other sub-disciplines within 
political science. At best one might suggest that ‘the goal of comparative politics is to 
encompass the major similarities and differences between countries’ (cf. Hague and Harrop 
2004: 62). Others add to this that such a systematic comparison is intended to enhance theory-
building and testing (cf. Mair 1996: 310), which is more often than not preceded by 
developing classifications and typologies that are derived from ‘thick descriptions’ of single 
cases (i.e. countries). Thus, these views imply: 
• Comparative politics focuses on cases: often countries or nation-states in order to 
understand more about them about them as political systems (Almond 1968; Lijphart 
1975; Lane and Ersson 1994). 
• Comparing systematically serves several goals like developing typologies (inducing 
‘concepts that can travel’; see: Sartori 1970) and classifications (which are cross-
national divisions between cases; see for example: Finer 1999). 
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• The comparative method allows for hypothesis testing, if not prediction (see: Mayer 
1989; Landman 2003: 10-14; Hague and Harrop 2004: 61). 
This rather behavioralist view on comparative politics overemphasizing its methodology is 
not only widespread but has also been contested by others (see for an overview: Ragin 1987; 
Peters 1998). This debate will not be repeated here and nor shall it be resolved here. Instead, I 
shall concentrate on the hazards, pitfalls and problems of carrying out a systematic 
comparative analysis of political systems with the aim to enhance its analytical strength. 
Hazards: most researchers assume that systems (e.g. countries) can be compared - if and 
when certain conditions have been met. Yet, it is a risky step in any comparative research 
design. How can we know that systems per se can indeed be compared? On the one hand, one 
needs to know whether differences are meaningful. On the other hand, one must be sure that 
what is considered to be similar is indeed by and large congruent.  
The same problem is, of course, related to the question of what is compared. What are the 
essential components of comparison? Is it government, societies, parties, policies, elections, et 
cetera? More often than not, comparativists develop categories that enable comparisons by 
means of functional equivalents (e.g. Dogan and Pelassy 1990; Collier and Mahon 1993). 
However, it remains an assumption that such concepts remain valid in comparative analysis. 
In addition, such a practice may be prone to over-determination and can lead to biased results 
and wrong conclusions (see: Lijphart 1975; Fauré 1994; Przeworski 1987; Rueschemeyer et 
al. 1992; Sartori 1994). Two problems can noted: conceptual stretching and assuming 
equivalence. These problems arise in particular if and when we attempt to compare many 
systems on the basis of controlling for contextual variation. Some fear that at the end of the 
day the comparison has only demonstrated probable causes, while the actual ‘proof in the 
pudding’ has not been delivered.  
Pitfalls: a continuing dispute among comparativists is about whether one aims at a 
comprehensive description of the cases involved (whether quantitative or qualitative) or at 
inferences of a theoretical nature on the basis of a description that can be generalized. This 
problem is not only related to the so-called ‘small N’ versus ‘large N’ debate (and how to 
overcome this; see: Holt and Turner 1970; Ragin 1987; Landman 2003). Important is also 
what type of variables (and related measures) are introduced in the research design (King et 
al. 1994; Pennings et al. 2006: Ch. 3). The less abstract the level of measurement the more 
valid they may be. However, such a practice implies that only a limited number of cases can 
be compared with a view at generalizing the findings. Conversely, the more abstract the 
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variables that are operationalized, the less reliable they are. Hence a major pitfall of 
comparing systems is to stress peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of systems’ components. 
Conversely, if and when the ‘ladder of abstraction’ (Cf. Sartori) is used too freely the 
similarities will tend to outnumber the observed differences. Thus, the comparativist ought to 
be aware of which cases or systems are compared in view of a balance in terms of meaningful 
information and proper explanation (see: Collier 1993; Landman 2003). In sum: the major 
problem of applying the comparative method at the macro-scopical level is making the right 
choice. The choice of what variables, which cases and what approach is not only important to 
avoiding pitfalls but is also conducive to finding meaningful answers. 
Problems: Francis Castles (1987) stated that too few data fitted too many theories. A 
major problem of comparative polities is that its advantage of being considered as a quasi-
experimental method is often jeopardized by the lack of comparable data (due to ‘thick’ 
description or non-matching levels of measurement), or invalid data (due to ‘high’ levels of 
abstractions), and simply due to missing data and cases (limiting the ‘universe of discourse’). 
All these insufficiencies have often led to generalizations that are simply derived from 
incomplete evidence. For instance, often one sees problems with temporal data that are 
consistent across systems. Another problem in this respect is the lack of information regarding 
decision-making processes. One way to solve this problem is obviously to improve the quality 
and availability of data across as many systems as possible.2 However, this road is long and 
winding because these data are often collected with a view at answering a specific research 
question guided by theory. An alternative way is to advance a theory guided research question 
first, then to develop a proper research design in order to create a valid and reliable data 
collection for a number of truly representative cases that allows for applying systematic and 
solid methods of data-analysis. What is proposed here implies that one is prepared to take 
‘theory’ as a point of departure and not the method or data available. What this implies will be 
discussed next. 
 
3.   Comparative Research and its Relation to Theory 
 
Comparative political research is generally defined in two ways: either on the basis of its 
supposed core subject, which is almost always defined at the level of political systems 
(Wallerstein 1974; Powell 1982; Dogan and Pelassy 1990) or by means of descriptive features 
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that claim to enhance knowledge about politics and society as a process (e.g.: Apter and 
Andrain 1972; Macridis and Burg 1991; Almond et al. 1993; Keman 2002). This combination 
of systemic analysis of political processes is generally considered to differentiate the 
comparative approach from other approaches within political and social science. Although it 
is a useful starting point, it is not sufficient to fully comprehend the advantages of the 
comparative approach with regard to positive theory development.  
Thus, the comparative approach ought to be elaborated in terms of its theoretical design 
and its research strategy on the basis of a goal-oriented point of reference, i.e. what exactly is 
to be explained. A way of achieving this is to argue for a more refined concept of ‘politics and 
society’ and develop concepts that can ‘travel’ – i.e. are truly comparative across systems – 
and can thus be related to the political process in various societies. In addition, a set of rules 
must be developed that direct the research strategy, aiming at explanations rather than at a 
complete description of political phenomena by comparing them across systems and through 
time. At this point most comparativists stop elaborating their approach and start investigating, 
often however, without realizing that theory and method are mutually interdependent (but see: 
Przeworski 1987; Mair 1996; Landman 2003). 
The goal of comparative analysis is to explain those ‘puzzles’, which cannot be studied 
without comparing and understand which potential answers ought to be derived from logical 
reasoning. Hence, no comparative research is useful without an extensive theoretical 
argument underlying it, or without a methodologically adequate research design to undertake 
it. For example, suppose we wish to know more about the relationship between economic 
development and the rise of the welfare state in democracies, in this instance, the type of 
research design is helpful in explaining the relationship.  In addition, if the research question 
explores the process of industrialization in a society promoting welfare policy-making by the 
democratic state, then one can grasp this more fully by studying one (or a few) systems 
through time. In such a research design the units of variation (i.e. level of industrialization and 
the contents of welfare related policy-formation) are taken into account from one period to 
another, e.g. from year to year are the units of observation (i.e. measuring the change over 
time). This may well enhance the internal validation of the explanation (it is ‘true’ for what 
has been studied) and is what Lijphart (1971) labels as the ‘Comparative Method’. Yet this is 
a somewhat misleading label. What is meant is that one employs a universe of discourse of 
which the cases are comparable with respect to their political and social context because they 
appear to be more similar than different (in this example:  countries with a democratic polity).  
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Apart from the epistemological problems of this approach (see: Mayer 1972; Przeworski 
1987; Fauré 1994; Ragin, 2000) and the statistical problems related to having too few cases 
and too many variables, this means that such an approach is based on ‘thick description’. 
Such an approach only yields randomly distributed variation across nations leading up to 
‘trivial’ knowledge. In this case the research design tends then to be one, which is somewhere 
between the positions (1) and (4) in Figure 1 below. Conversely, if one wishes to know – for 
instance – whether or not the degree of industrialization brings about the development of 
welfare statism (see e.g. Wilensky 1975), one has to compare more cases simultaneously. 
This is position (3) in Figure 1. However, if the research question is to what extent the welfare 
state is the result of economic growth, one must take into account both time and space in 
order to reach viable conclusions, i.e. position (5) in Figure 1. Hence, it is the (theoretical) 
argument (in the form of research question) that directs the type and necessity of comparison 
– the research design – as is illustrated by means of Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1:  Relating Research Questions to a Research Design  
 
 
 
 
                                         One case                        Few cases                      All relevant cases 
                                     
                                                        (1)                                                                        (4) 
                                                               
 
 
 
Time dimensions              Few intervals                          (3) 
                                                                                                  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
                                          All relevant                                                                        (5) 
                                          time units (2) 
 
 
With respect to the relation RQ -> RD =  
(1) case study (at one time point);  
(2) time series (one case over time);  
(3) closed universe (relevant cases in relevant periods);  
(4) cross-section (all cases at one time point);  
(5) pooled analysis (maximizing cases across time and space).  
Adapted from: Pennings et al., 2006: 21.        
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A first and vital step in the process is to ponder over the relationship between the cases under 
review and the variables employed in the analysis (Landman 2003; Peters 1998; Keman 
1993c). There is a trade off between the two: the more cases one compares, the less variables 
are often available and vice versa (Przeworski 1987; Ragin 1987). In Section 4 I shall 
elaborate this problem in full, but for now it suffices to put forward that the conversion of the 
research question into a viable research design poses inevitable problems for the researcher.  
To complicate things even more, one has also to consider whether or not ‘time’ is a relevant 
factor to be taken into account (Bartolini 1993).  
In Figure 1 this problem of choice has been depicted. Five options are distinguished: 
First, a single case study per se (see: Yin 1996) cannot be considered as a comparative 
research design. Implicitly it may be, but in terms of external validity it is not. However, it is 
often used for reason of validation post hoc (to inspect whether or not the general results hold 
up in a more detailed analysis) or to study a deviant case (i.e. a case that is seemingly an 
‘exception to the rule’). An advantage of a single case study is that it allows for the inclusion 
of a lager variety of variables than otherwise would be feasible and can be used as a pilot for 
generating hypotheses (see Section 6.3 below). Hence, I consider a single case study as a 
device within a larger research design, but not as a means for positive theory development as 
such. Alternatively a single case study over time is often used as a theory confirming or 
infirming analysis based on a country’s history with a specific focus derived from the research 
duestion in use (Landman 2003). The third option in Figure 1 concerns the ‘few’ cases 
alternative, and allows for taking into account time (be it before/after a discrete event – like 
war or economic crisis – or be it certain periods that are seen as crucial for the cases involved; 
Bartolini 1993). A few(er) cases research design is seen as a ‘focused comparison’ that is 
directly derived from the research question under review (Ragin 1991). Option number 4 is 
frequently used: it concerns those cases that have more in common that they differ from each 
other depending on the research question (Collier 1993). The advantage is that the universe of 
discourse is more or less a ‘closed shop’ and therefore the validity of the analytical results 
within the universe of discourse will be enhanced. It is typically conducive to so-called 
“middle range” theorizing (Lane and Ersson 1994). The final option (5) is strongly disputed 
among comparativists. On the one hand, the number of cases is indeed maximized, but, on the 
other hand, there is the pitfall that the impact of time is considered to be constant across all 
cases (or, at least, that change is consistent within the cases under review; see: Hicks 1994; 
Kittel 1999). Hence, the issue is whether or not change can be assumed to be consistent for 
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the cases under review (like for instance the impact of widening and deepening of the 
European Union). 
If one were to go through the literature or the major political science journals, one finds 
numerous examples of how a research question is indeed translated into a research design in 
which each of the possibilities has been chosen. For instance, the study of Dutch 
Consociationalism (Daalder 1974) is a one-case/time series research design (# 2 in Figure 1) 
whereas Lijphart’s study of Democracies (Lijphart 1984; 1999) is a cross-sectional analysis of 
all relevant cases (#4). Many studies on Welfare States more often than not use a research 
design in which all relevant cases are included and are studied over time albeit for a few 
period-points only (#3; see for instance: Castles 1982; Esping-Andersen 1990; Lane and 
Ersson 1999). The analysis of coalition governments (see De Swaan 1973; Laver and 
Schofield 1990; Budge and Keman 1990; Müller and Strøm 1999) is often done in 
combination of as many relevant cases as possible and for as many points in time as feasible. 
This is what is also called a pooled time series Research Design (#5). In fact, the last example 
also demonstrates that we are indeed not interested in countries as cases, but – depending on 
the research question – on features of a political system such as: governments, parties, interest 
groups, voters, institutions and so on. In these instances the number of cases will often be 
much larger, if and when all relevant cases are included. 
Yet the main point is that the options for choice as depicted here are not free. On the 
contrary, if industrialization is seen as a process it must be investigated over time in order to 
answer the question if this process results in societal change produced by Welfare Statism. A 
good example of employing this type of comparison can be found in Flora’s analysis of West 
European Welfare States (Flora 1974). Various European countries were analyzed from the 
point that they slowly developed into more or less constitutional liberal democracies until the 
present. In effect, not the actual number of countries was important but the number of years 
(i.e. #2 in Figure 1). By comparing the rates of change with the rate of democratization it 
became possible to demonstrate when and under which conditions the welfare state 
developed. Studies of Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) and Lane and Ersson (1997) show the 
respective utilization of a research design as depicted above under (#4) and (#5). 
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) focus on comparing democracies in view of their class 
composition. Lane and Ersson (1997), on the other hand, were analyzing whether or not 
economic growth, when a certain level had been reached, led to the establishment of a 
Welfare State.  
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In most discussions, it appears however, that both theoretical and methodological aspects 
are divorced, or – at least – treated separately. For example, Ragin (1987) and Przeworski 
(1987) emphasize predominantly the methodological aspects of the art of comparison as a 
‘logic of inquiry’, which is often underdeveloped or incompletely elaborated. At the same 
time these authors argue their case by means of examples that are seemingly picked at 
random. Worse even, it seems that some of the examples are selected to demonstrate the 
tenability of their view. Theoretical progress and explanatory results appear then to emanate 
from their ‘logic of inquiry’ (see: Przeworski 1987: 45ff.; Ragin 1987: 125ff.). Yet, the 
comparative analysis of the political process within systems must be instead founded a priori 
in theory and then related to the best fitting ‘logic of inquiry’, or in our terms: a proper 
research design. This point is much overlooked and impairs positive theory development. 
An example of such a separation of theory and method can be found in many studies 
of electoral behavior. This vital element of the political process in democracies can be 
explained fairly well on the basis of deductive reasoning (Crewe and Denver 1985). To 
validate its micro-level founded hypotheses regarding individual behavior a comparative 
research design is not necessary. However, electoral behavior or party behavior that is 
explained by means of the working of electoral systems, or the features of a party system, are 
in need of a comparative analysis by means of examining the variation in the political 
properties on both the micro- and macro-level (see, for example, Sani and Sartori, 1983; Lane 
and Ersson 1999). If not, the analysis is not only based on assuming the ceteris paribus clause, 
but is also prone to ecological fallacy. 
Another example concerns the study of ‘electoral volatility’ in Western Europe. It 
appeared that the division of party systems and the structure of voting patterns are less 
stabilized than originally assumed. In practice many of these comparative studies were, in 
fact, based on country-based analytical descriptions with little comparative information. What 
was lacking was a truly comparative set of theoretical references concerning – in this case – 
the explicandum i.e. ‘political stability’ that at the same time is consciously linked to a 
comparable set of operational terms (but see: Bartolini and Mair 1990: 35-46). In other words: 
if the explicandum is not equal to a system per se, but can be considered as a part of a system, 
such as governments or electoral results obviously must reflect on the question of whether or 
not the research question is formulated to explain government or electoral volatility in a 
number of given systems, or alternatively, to explain the phenomenon of government 
functioning or electoral change. In the former instance specific elements of a political system 
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are compared between systemic units of analysis (often countries), and in the latter case intra-
systemic phenomena are compared for all relevant cases.  
Other examples could be mentioned to support this importance of the relation between 
theory and method in comparative politics. Yet, the principal message is that much of the re-
search that is labeled as comparative, either lacks a theoretical foundation of what 
mechanisms various systems have in common (and why), or is based on a research design that 
is not truly comparative, and are rather collections of information about separate systems (see 
for example: Dahl 1966; Pridham 1986; Müller and Strøm 1999).  
The main lesson to be drawn from the examples listed here as an elaboration of Figure 
1 is that the research question per se ought to direct the research design in terms of the 
essential units of variation (like governments, elections, welfare statism et cetera) which 
imply the theoretical relationships under review and also direct the units of observation (like 
years if change is focused upon or all parliamentary governments across the whole universe of 
discourse). Given this line of reasoning, which is essential to my approach to comparative 
research in relation to positive theory development, it is crucial to develop first a theoretical 
perspective in order to relate systematically the research question to possible research designs: 
Theory comes before method and research questions before research design. If this line of 
inquiry is not adhered to then comparative political analysis will and cannot be conducive to 
positive theory development. 
 
4.    Comparative analysis: controlling for the context 
 
The comparative approach to politics and society is usually defined both by its substance (the 
study of a number of societies or systems, i.e. the cases under review) and by its method (e.g. 
cross-sectional, comparable cases, longitudinal etc., see Figure 1). However, in this way the 
necessary link between theory and method as well as the distinctiveness of the comparative 
approach in terms of what and when to compare is neglected. Hence, if the comparative 
approach is meant to enhance positive theory development in political science, the 
combination of theory and method should be elaborated. In my view theory equals the 
propositions concerning the explanation of relationships that characterize the working of 
political systems and the societal developments that are (supposed to be) affected by it. 
Method is then the most appropriate way to investigate the proposed relationships 
empirically. As stated before, comparing in this way is one of the common tenets underlying 
much if not all research in the social sciences. Yet, one needs to realize all the time that this 
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refers to the ‘logic’ of systematically finding answers to questions about the complexities of 
reality. This logic has already been used for a long time and has been described by John Stuart 
Mill (1843/1976) as the methods of Agreement and Difference (see also: Pennings et al. 2006: 
Ch. 3). Comparison is then an instrument to verify or falsify relationships between two 
phenomena. Hence, I consider this logic as an integral part of the comparative approach by 
stressing the link between the research question, on the one hand, and the research design, on 
the other. If and when one strives for analytical-empirically founded knowledge – as is our 
point of departure – and it concerns the analysis of various political systems it must be 
reflected whether or not this concerns an inter-system (between systems as a whole) or an 
intra-system comparison (of features within multiple systems). For example, if one studies 
party-behavior within a national system, then one is still comparing parties, unless one is only 
interested in pure description. The same line of reasoning applies to specific groups or 
organizations in a society. Hence, if the aim is to explain the variation between systems of 
specific features of different systems then the issue of controlling for the context becomes 
eminent.  
As Sartori (1994: 244f.) stresses, we need to compare in order to control the variables that 
make up the theoretical relationship. In fact, what the researcher is attempting to do is to 
identify the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the relationship occurs in reality. 
This would entail the assumption that all other things (or: conditions) are equal except for the 
relationship under empirical review (the Ceteris Paribus clause). The more explicit the 
relationship between the research question and research design is of a comparative nature, the 
more positive the analytical results will be. If we look, for instance, at the relationship 
between ‘class society’, democratization and the emergence of ‘welfare states’ the 
relationship is apparent if we examine the developments in the UK and Sweden, New Zealand 
and Australia (Castles 1978, 1985). Yet, the answer could well have been different to this 
research question if we would have also focused on the Netherlands, Germany and Italy (Van 
Kersbergen 1995) where the role of religion-based organizations – the church in particular – 
and not class-based organizations used to be one of the central foci of political behavior and 
action. Hence, only when we take into account as many relevant and concurrent cases as 
possible is it possible to reach a viable and plausible conclusion concerning socio-economic 
divisions in society and related consequences in terms of welfare regulation. Similarly, the 
question whether or not economic developments are also dependent on types of democratic 
governance and interest intermediation cannot be fully answered by studying one country, or 
– like Olson (1982) did – by comparing only the states within the USA. Thus the basic 
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message is that the degree of control of contextual features is essential to reach sound 
analytical conclusions. From this point of view, it appears reasonable to conclude – as Dalton 
(1991) does – that it is almost impossible to conceive of serious explanatory work in political 
and social science that is not at least implicitly comparative. Actually, we could go even 
further by putting forward that the comparative approach is the fundamental point of 
departure for most theories that figure in political and social science. Such a statement implies 
that the comparative method is not only preferred, but required in those situations in which 
there is no possible recourse to experimental techniques or when the number of observations 
do not allow for the use of statistical techniques that are based on sampling (see also Lijphart 
1975; Mayer 1989; Collier 1993; Beck, 2001; Pennings et al. 2006). 
Summing up: analyzing political systems by means of the comparative approach implies 
first of all the elaboration of a research question. This may concern either an implicit 
comparison – as defined by the universe of discourse – or an explicit comparison based on a 
comparative research design, which defines the selection of cases that must be taken into 
account. Since this paper focuses on comparing systems we shall only discuss ‘truly 
comparative’ research designs. This choice implies that one should always ask how the 
central concepts that figure in the theory-guided research question are meaningfully (i.e. in a 
valid and reliable way) translated into variables: units of observation that vary across cases 
(i.e. systems). In addition this also implies that the researcher ought to decide which cases are 
to be included and why. Unbiased case selection is therefore one of the most daunting tasks in 
doing ‘truly’ comparative research.  
 
5. Selecting cases in relation to the comparative logic of inquiry 
 
The choice of cases is not only important as to regards valid and reliable measurement and the 
inclusion of those systems that can be compared meaningfully with respect to the research 
question, but is also crucial with respect to the issue whether or not the case selection allows 
for a proper interpretation of the research questions asked.  
Firstly, the researcher must decide which systems are truly different with respect to the 
relationship under review, but are not different as regards to their basic systemic features (see 
Easton 1990: Ch. 10). If this procedure is adequately carried out it may be expected that the 
results of the subsequent analysis are valid internally (valid for all comparable cases included 
in the actual analysis). In other words: the research answer allows for firm conclusions that 
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help to develop and substantiate so-called ‘middle range’ theories (Lane and Ersson 1994; 
Chilcote 1994).  
Secondly, the researcher ought to decide whether or not specific systemic features are 
central to the argument made (e.g. electoral systems, party behavior or welfare states) or 
systems as a whole are subject of investigation (this can be countries, or clusters of countries 
[e.g. continents], or states within a federal system). This design belongs to the ‘traditional’ 
type of comparative politics (Almond 1968; Daalder 1993). 
Thirdly, the selection of cases needs to be adequate in terms of the logic of comparison 
and is a tricky decision between two alternatives: Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD), this 
is the Method of Difference, and Most Different Systems Design (MDSD), that is the Method 
of Agreement (see also Przeworski and Teune 1970; Landman 2003; Pennings et al. 2006). 
John Stuart Mill in his “System of Logic” has developed the methods of Difference and 
Agreement (1843/1976). The basic idea is that comparing cases can be used to detect 
commonalities between cases. The Method of Difference focuses in particular on the variation 
of certain features amongst others that do not differ (strongly) across comparable cases. 
Hence, co-variation is here considered crucial under the assumption of holding the context 
constant: locating independent variables that differ among similar systems, but which account 
for observed political outcomes (the dependent variable). Conversely, the Method of 
Agreement is comparing cases (or systems) in order to detect those relationships between X 
 Y that are similar notwithstanding the remaining differences on other features of the cases 
compared. Hence, all other things are considered to be different but for certain relationships 
that are seen to be causal (or effect-productive; Janoski and Hicks 1994: 14).  
 As Ragin asserts the problem of interpreting the analytical results remains. If the shared 
commonalities between variables are emphasized then it concerns an implicit urge for 
parsimonious results that excludes non-conforming cases (in statistical terms: the 
“unexplained variance” of a model). Conversely if the possible combinations of effect-
producing conditions are taken into account then parsimony is not the aim of the analysis but 
the comprehensiveness of the explanation. In our view both approaches are viable and 
plausible, but one must be alert to the fact that the choice of method and the selection of cases 
have serious ramifications for the ‘logic of inquiry’ underlying the research design that is 
developed. Too often this is not the case, however. 
This ‘logic of inquiry’ or in our parlance – the relationship between research question and 
research design – runs as follows: in a Most Similar Systems Design, where we compare as 
many cases as feasible, assuming that these cases have more contextual features in common 
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than not, we interpret the research outcomes by concentrating on the variation across the 
cases. This type of explanation is developed on the basis of the ‘method of difference’. Hence, 
in a Most Similar Systems Design the focus is on the correspondence between the dependent 
and independent variables on the basis of their cross-variation. Conversely the Most Different 
Systems Approach is based on the Method of (indirect) Agreement or degree of commonality 
between independent variables within each case. In other words the variation within cases 
guides the eventual interpretation of the analysis. An example of this ‘logic of inquiry’ can be 
found in the study of the relationship between Capitalism and Democracy (Rueschemeyer et 
al. 1992) and in Barrington Moore’s treatise on Democracies and Dictatorship (Barrington 
Moore 1966). In both studies the research design was starting from the idea that the 
comparison is meant to confront positive (i.e.: yes, there is a relationship between capitalism 
and democracy) and negative outcomes (no, there is not). The Method of Agreement is also 
called the ‘parallel demonstration of theory’ (cf. Skocpol and Somers 1980). The Method of 
Agreement tends to be conducive to internally valid conclusions. An alternative option to 
improve the external validity that is widely discussed and disputed is the application of 
Boolean Analysis (Ragin 1987, 2000). This type of analysis allows for the handling of 
qualitative information, or many variables for a relative high number of cases. The logic 
underlying this approach is that multiple causation is studied across cases by means of 
configurations of conditions that impact on the dependent variable. Yet, instead of focusing 
on bi-variate relations or a parallel demonstration by case analysis “Truth Tables” are 
developed representing causal patterns across the universe of discourse. This logic of inquiry 
rests on eliminating possible combinations of conditional effects between cases. This 
approach is called Qualitative Case Analysis (QCA) (see for example: De Meur and Berg-
Schlosser 1994; Ragin 1991). In summary: 
• In comparative analysis we are confronted with the dilemma to choose for a research 
design in which we trade off internal against external validity due to the problem of 
many cases, few variables (MSSD) and vice versa (MDSD); 
• By choosing a MSSD-approach we assume the context to be (more or less) identical 
across all the cases under review, whereas a MDSD-approach enables us, by 
controlling for the contextual variation, to compare systematically selected cases; 
• A MSSD-approach follows a logic of inquiry that is based on the co-variation between 
X and Y-variables, i.e. eliminating cross-system differences, whereas the MDSD-
approach induces a logic of inquiry where the parallel demonstration of cases under 
investigation is based on eliminating cases. 
18  
 
Up to this point this paper has focused on the problems, difficulties and limits of comparing 
political systems systematically aiming at positive theory development. This is useful in our 
view since many studies that claim to be comparative and are considered to develop new 
insights more often than not do not live up to the cannons of comparative political science. 
Yet, at the same time progress has been made over time and there are exciting examples of 
‘positive theory development’: the deliberate attempt to constructing theories, firmly based on 
empirical evidence by means of a proper comparative analysis of political phenomena on the 
so-called ‘system’ level. Below, in the penultimate section three of these approaches will be 
elaborated.  
 
6. The Practice of Comparing Political Systems 
 
Going beyond sheer description as Lord Bryce did as well as trying to explain rather than to 
map out systems as, for example Blondel (1981) or Finer (1999) did by means of complex 
classifications and typologies, signifies the ability to advance testable propositions. The three 
approaches that will be elaborated below have this in common, but certainly not in the same 
way. They differ in their approach to developing theory, in selecting cases, the type of data 
used, and the logic of comparison applied. Yet, by consciously combining theory and the 
comparative method, all are able to enhance positive theory development. 
 
6.1  Contesting existing views: Does Politics Matter? 
The first example concerns the debate in the straightforward question: Does Politics Matter? 
(the following is based on: Castles 1982; Keman 1997; 2002a; Schmidt 1987; 1996). The 
origins of this debate go back to the 1960s and 1970s (see Castles and McKinley 1979). 
During this era some political economists published articles on the emergence and cross-
national variation of the welfare state in industrialized democracies (see: Wilensky 1975; 
Flora 1974). The shared view was at the time that basically the development and degree of 
‘Welfare Statism’ had little to do with ‘politics’ (parties, governments, ideologies) and much 
more with structural tendencies within the advanced capitalist countries (i.e. the member-
states of the OECD). What mattered most as regards to explaining ‘welfare statism’ were the 
“logic of industrialism”, the rates of economic growth and the demographic composition of 
post-war societies (see for an overview of these factors: Castles 1998; Keman 1998). These 
three factors could be viewed as the conditions for public policy formation with respect to 
education, health care, social security and income redistribution. Political factors like party 
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differences (e.g. Left vs. Right) and the relative strength of such parties in government and the 
strength of trade unions (see Korpi 1983) were considered as only indirectly relevant (or at 
best coincidental). Hence politics did not matter. 
A group of comparativists, however, were not satisfied with this conclusion. The first 
reason being that the non-political variables was insufficiently capable of explaining the 
cross-national differences in ‘welfare statism’. Hence the unexplained variance was too large 
to afford such conclusions as universally correct (or: externally valid). Secondly, it appeared 
that if one looked more closely at the development over time, the levels of expenditures on 
welfare state related policy-making tended to become more divergent. Thirdly, examining the 
various components of ‘welfare statism’ (i.e. the different policies pursued) it could be 
demonstrated that the design of the welfare state showed a large cross-system variation (see 
for example Esping-Andersen 1990; Castles 1993; Kuhnle 2000). In short: the more welfare 
states developed, the stronger the differences grew regardless of whether the shared 
contextual features of the countries were included in the analysis. 
These conclusions led to the idea that the socio-economic and demographic factors may 
well have explained the emergence of welfare states, but certainly not their subsequent 
development. Hence the unexplained cross-system variation needed to be investigated. The 
guiding research question became therefore: Does Politics Matter as regards to the design and 
development of welfare states? The research design that was developed was in essence: the 
universe of discourse, or the cases included, concerned those OECD-member states that could 
be considered as fully fledged representative democracies and having a similar level of 
economic development (option #4 in Figure 1). The central relationship under review was: 
whether or not the impact of parties and organized interests through elected government on 
the shape and degree of welfare statism was relevant rather than simply cross-national 
variation per se.  
This research question allowed for a research design with a fixed number of cases 
(OECD-democracies) and a Most Similar Systems comparison (hence controlling for other 
influences). The actual ‘test’ aimed at a true comparison of two explanations: Economics 
versus Politics on the basis of the ‘Method of Difference’ (see Section 5). In fact, the first 
stage of the debate on ‘Does Politics Matter?’ aimed at a replication of existing studies of 
‘welfare statism’, namely using the same type of cases and socio-economic variables, but 
adding political variables to the equation. Applying the Ceteris Paribus clause and both cross-
sectional and cross-time comparisons it was possible to demonstrate beyond doubt that 
politics did matter. Notwithstanding the role of socio-economic factors, it became clear that 
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parties in government made a difference and the longer the same parties remained in office 
the stronger the growth of welfare statism was (Klingemann et al. 1994; Lane and Ersson 
1997; Keman 2002a). 
The research answer was therefore that ‘politics matters’ as regards to public policy 
formation in representative democracy. This answer formed the basis for further theory 
building in two ways: On the one hand, the relationship between type of parties and the form 
of government is relevant for the type and level of welfare statism (Castles et al. 1987; Swank 
2001). On the other hand, the debate opened up new avenues for specifying under what 
conditions, in particular institutional variation, the actual performance of welfare state could 
be explained in terms of growth and retrenchment. Both directions have led to a host of 
studies since the 1980s to further positive theory development (see, for instance, Pennings 
1995; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Pierson 2001; Armingeon and Bonoli 2006). 
In summary: by applying systematic comparative research to a contested issue, a well-
established approach in political science has been developed. This approach focused explicitly 
on one central relationship across most similar systems and aimed at explaining this. Thus it is 
not the cross-national variation that is crucial but the inter-systemic comparison. By doing so, 
the study of the welfare state moved beyond sheer description and post hoc interpretations. 
 
6.2         How cooperation between parties develops: Coalition Theory 
Some political scientists argue that the essence of politics is to form coalitions (Laver 1983). 
Coalition theory has, understandably, gained a lot of attention. If one would indeed 
understand the mechanism of coalition formation then one could also explain the power 
distribution within political systems (Riker 1962). The application of a comparative systems’ 
approach to the development of coalition theory is our second example.  
In its origins mathematicians have developed coalition theory, which has been applied by 
political scientists by means of virtual designs, game theory or single case based descriptions 
(De Swaan 1973). Slowly, but gradually coalition theory has been elaborated upon along two 
dimensions: one, through the use of spatial analysis of political actors within party systems 
(Laver and Schofield 1990), and two, by the introduction of policy distances and institutional 
constraints (Budge and Keman 1990; Laver and Budge 1992). Both approaches have been 
seminal to the positive theory development on coalition formation and both approaches 
achieved this through the deliberate use of the comparative method. Yet, both approaches 
used this methodology differently. 
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Already in the 1970s it became clear that the hypothetic-deductive logic that dominated 
the study of coalition formation did not stand up to empirical reality. More often than not the 
predictions emanating from deductive reasoning proved to be inadequate or imprecise. Arend 
Lijphart (1984: 52) reports that there was an inverse relationship between the degrees of 
parsimony of these theories3 and their empirical results. In short: although its logic seemed 
compelling, its ability to predict correctly turned out to be weak. 
The research question that emerged has been: how to improve the explanatory quality of 
coalition theory in terms of positive theory development? The answer to this question has 
been the elaboration of a two-dimensional model: Policy-seeking and Office-seeking behavior 
of the actors (i.e. parties) involved would direct their strategy. Laver and Schofield used this 
model to construct equilibriums among parties that shape the best possible space for co-
operation. Budge and Keman used the same dimensions, but took into account a number of 
negotiation rules (i.e. institutions) between parties that defined the room for maneuver to form 
an optimal coalition (Strøm, 1990). 
The next step was, of course, to develop a research strategy that enabled the researchers to 
test their models. Laver and Schofield choose a comparative design in which party systems 
were the cases to be compared, whereas Budge and Keman included all party governments in 
established democracies as comparable cases. Hence, these research strategies were not based 
on nations, or on political systems per se. Given the research question, the unit of co-variation 
was equal to the central element to be analyzed: party government and party system. In 
addition, the research design of Laver and Schofield employed a Most Different Systems 
Design (i.e. the Method of Agreement) because their hypothesis was that identical space for 
co-operation was the result of establishing a similar equilibrium between different parties 
wherever this occurred. Conversely, Budge and Keman employed a Most Similar Systems 
Design by classifying the cases according to the extant rules (institutions) and ideological 
differences across all systems under review. Hence, different logics of comparison have been 
used to answer the same research question (see Section 5). 
The results of both comparative analyses corroborated empirically the two-dimensional 
model of policy-seeking and office-seeking behavior of parties. Laver and Schofield (1990) 
were able to show that in multi-party systems the mathematical logic of the original coalition 
theory did not always work. Furthermore they demonstrated that coalitions could better be 
explained by taking into account the intra-systemic variations across party systems and their 
change over time. It was a dynamic explanation (see also Laver and Budge 1992). 
                                                           
. 
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Budge and Keman (1990) made it possible to develop a configurative set of institutional 
conditions that correlated with the type of coalition government that was formed. In addition, 
they were also able to demonstrate empirically which type of coalition was more enduring 
than others and how their policy-making capacities varied (see also Warwick 1994). In other 
words: not only could the formation of party government be better explained, but also the 
performance of government could be studied. 
In summary: comparing systems, i.e. the ‘life and times’ of party government, helped to 
enhance existing theory in two ways: one, empirical analysis showed the weakness of existing 
approaches and helped to develop fresh insights; two, by focusing explicitly and 
systematically on the central subject of research, party government, and elaborating an 
empirically informed model positive theory development could be achieved. 
 
 6.3     From Consociationalism to Consensus Democracy: From case analysis to universe 
The final example is the positive theory development in the field of democratic theory. It 
concerns the work of Arend Lijphart (1977; 1984; 1999). This is an interesting example 
because he developed his theoretical advances by means of using different research designs in 
relation to the same research question. Arend Lijphart is well known through his work on the 
Dutch political system that he described by means of the ‘politics of accommodation’ 
(Lijphart 1968). 
These ideas did not develop by coincidence during the 1960s. Basically they can be seen 
as a reaction to US-based theories on how democracies function optimally (or: remain stable). 
The so-called ‘pluralist’ school had developed an empirical theory, which demonstrated that 
stable democracy mainly occurred in homogeneous societies where there was open and fair 
competition between organized interests. If these conditions were not (more or less) met then 
conflict would erode efficient and democratic governance (Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 
1966). 
By employing a single case analysis of the Dutch political system Lijphart showed that 
this is not true for all democratic systems. Put bluntly, the Dutch case proved that, under the 
adverse conditions of fragmentation and ‘cartelised’ party systems, stable government did 
exist. In other words, Lijphart used a single case study to show that the external validity (i.e. 
universality) of the pluralist school was weak, if not disproved. Hence, in this case the 
research design: comparable case analysis (see also Lijphart 1975) was used to question 
fundamentally a rival research question: how stable are democracies in divided societies? 
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The next step in Lijphart’s attempt to positive theory development as regards to the 
optimal working of representative democracy was to elaborate his Dutch findings 
comparatively. In his “Democracy in Plural Societies” (1977) he compared as many 
democratic systems as possible that could be considered as fragmented (i.e. instable) societies 
and could be considered as multi-party systems. In a way, Lijphart ‘exported’ his 
consociational model in order to show that there existed an alternative explanation of the 
occurrence of ‘stable’ democracies. Hence, his research design became a cross-system one: all 
relevant cases were included with the aim to answer the following research question: under 
what conditions can plural (if not fragmented) societies achieve stable democracy? The 
answer to this question was based on a Most Different Systems Design (Method of 
Agreement): although the contextual variation among his cases was high, the analysis was 
directed to exploring the similarity of the conditions that were favorable to consensus and 
made conflict-resolution possible. Alternatively one could suggest that the same result would 
have been achieved by using the QCA-approach (see Demeur and Berg-Schlosser 1994; 
Ragin 2000). 
This inductively developed alternative theory was further elaborated in his books 
“Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarean and Consensus Government in 21 Countries” (1984) 
and “Patterns of Democracy” (1999). In these comparative studies the research design 
changed again. The 1984 study was considering 21 cases that involved most established 
representative democracies, regardless of being fragmented or not and with co-operative party 
systems or not. This change to a Most Similar Systems Design was caused due to a changing 
research question: do consensus-oriented democratic systems perform better than conflict-  
oriented democracies? 
Note that a changing research question thus directs the research design! Instead of 
demonstrating that non-pluralist democracies could produce stable government, the aim 
became to show that there are two types of democracy: a majoritarean one and a consensus 
democratic one. In order to achieve positive theory development it was necessary to control 
for variation (the Ceteris Paribus clause) and to focus mainly on the institutional variation 
across systems: from a sociology driven theory Lijpart moved towards an institutional 
approach of how democracy works under varying conditions. 
In summary: Lijphart’s lifelong involvement with positive theory developments shows 
how vital the choice of a research design is. First of all, it depends, of course, on the research 
question asked. This was an empirical question. Secondly, by moving from a critical case 
study to a comparable case analysis, he could demonstrate that his original case study (of the 
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Netherlands) was not a deviant one (or: an exception to the rule). Thirdly, this analysis 
formed the foundation to develop an alternative model of representative democracy. Finally, 
in his last study he has elaborated this alternative model – Consensus Democracy – as a rival 
theory of democracy. Hence, positive theory development may well involve different modes 
of comparison across systems although the topic of research remains the same. 
 
7. Conclusions: Comparing Political Systems and Positive Theory Development 
 
The comparative approach in political science has for a long time suffered from several 
methodological weaknesses and a biased focus. To remedy these shortcomings comparativists 
have developed new directions for doing comparative political research. One of these 
directions is presented in this paper (see Sections 3 and 4). The obvious caveat is, of course, 
that it is not the only way to go. Yet, I believe that this approach is a viable and feasible 
trajectory for the comparative analysis of political systems that induces positive theory 
development. 
The essential message of this paper is to consciously and permanently relate substance 
(the study of political phenomena at the system level) with method (the deliberate reflection 
on the use of empirical evidence). This message has been elaborated throughout this paper by 
pointing to prevalent pitfalls and hazards as well as taking into account caveats. If the student 
of comparative politics constantly reflects on matters of case selection, concept development 
and the underlying logic of comparison then he or she will travel more safely. The central 
instrument to do so – so I argue – is to develop arguments by means of the ‘triad’ Research 
Question – Research Design – Research Answer (see: Pennings et al. 2006: Part I).  
An important caveat remains, however, not to fall victim to the bias of equating cases 
with nation-states and consider these as systems by definition. A second caveat is that the 
choice of cases implies logic of comparison that should allow for a proper control of 
contextual variation – features that are case-specific but not relevant – and the possible 
conclusions that can be drawn from the available evidence. Finally, the type of research 
strategy also determines in what way system analysis is carried out: aiming at comparing 
systems’ elements or the comparison between systems: coalition theory aims at analyzing a 
crucial intra-systemic element of representative democracy, whereas Lijphart attempts to 
analyze the working of democratic systems. The question whether or not politics matters is a 
demonstration of inter-system type of analysis.  
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To highlight our message: we have discussed three approaches that have emerged in 
comparative political science. These served as examples of how the comparative approach can 
be utilized to advance theory development within political science. Although the art of 
comparing political processes may seem complex and difficult it can be applied successfully. 
Yet it is first of all, a matter of ‘look before you leap’ by formulating the correct questions 
guided by theory and choosing the proper research design including careful case selection and 
concepts that can travel. However, this is (or: ought to be) a matter of fact for any type of 
analysis within political science that is theory guided and aiming at empirically grounded 
explanations in order to advance positive theory. 
 
Footnotes 
1. Critical overviews of Comparative Politics as a sub-discipline are: Mayer 1989, Keman 1993, Mair 1996, 
Landman 2003, and Ragin 2000. The major contested issues are – apart from the nationalist bias – the 
theoretical weight and the methodological rigor that is established within comparative political science.  
2. An important requirement is the development of data-banks; see, for example, the Comparative Political 
Data Set as developed by Klaus Armingeon et al.; or the data-set published by Arend Lijphart, 1999, or the 
one put together by Budge et al. 2001, and also Lane et al. 1997 and Woldendorp et al. 2000 as well as 
those published by international agencies like ILO, the EU, the UN, the OECD, the IPU et cetera. 
3. For example the Minimal Winning and Minimal Size principle as well adjusted versions like Minimal 
Range and Minimal Connected Winning coalitions; see for this: De Swaan 1973; Lijphart 1984: Ch. 4; 
Budge and Keman 1990. 
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